What do a massive uptick in deposits, a possible impending recession, and a tremendous hike in interest rates have in common? Absolute potential for wreaking havoc on your institution’s liquidity position. One unplanned or mismanaged situation could mean falling out of policy limits, or worse.
Establishing and maintaining a sound interest rate risk (IRR) program is crucial to ensure proper balance sheet structure and comply with Regulatory expectations. During my 20+ years as a senior FDIC examiner, I routinely saw organizations experiencing issues with their ALM/IRR practices, ranging from loose misunderstandings of the guidance to critical errors that put the health of the organization at risk. Unfortunately, in my current advisory role, I see the same issues all too often.
About two years ago, I wrote a blog declaring the end to, or “the death of,” Surge Deposits. In that post, I had noted how at the time of, and following the 2007-2009 Great Recession, the banking industry saw a substantial influx of deposits as real estate and equity investors liquidated positions and sought safe places to store their money and ride out the storm. I further noted that as CD rates plummeted during, and following, the economic crisis, CD holders weren’t being provided with any incentive to have their money “locked” into time deposits. As time deposits matured, CD holders routinely moved their balances into more liquid non-maturity deposits (NMDs). These former CD holders were essentially temporarily “parking” their money in NMD accounts, just waiting for CD rates to return to what they believed were more “normal” levels, at which time they’d move the balances back into time deposits.
The Fed has officially raised rates, with the intention of continuing to do so several more times this year. What does that mean for your financial institution, and how will it affect your Budgeting and ALM/IRR programs in 2022? Let’s focus on a few areas of concern, specifically Financial Reporting, Strategic Decision Making, and Board/ALCO oversight.
Regulatory guidance states that the board of directors has the ultimate responsibility for the risks undertaken by an institution – including interest rate risk (IRR) and liquidity management.
The board is typically made up of a diverse group of individuals from varying backgrounds and career paths. Unlike most positions within a financial institution, a board member does not necessarily come from a banking background. One board could easily include a local entrepreneur, a farmer, a financial planner, a retired financial institution CEO, and a local insurance agent; while another board could be comprised of almost all former bankers. It’s often the most differing group in a similar role across financial institutions – so, since one size does not fit all, how do you train directors for their position on the board?
Is IRR and Liquidity Cash Flow Model Outsourcing Right for You?
That is a question a lot of CFOs and Presidents struggle with. Here at Plansmith, it really doesn’t matter to us whether you run the model yourself, or you outsource it to us. In fact, we have many clients on both sides of that fence, and even some that do a little of each. We just want you to be comfortable with whichever option you choose, be confident in your model results, and be sure your ALM process will pass the test at regulatory exams.
Given the current low-rate environment, I’ve again been getting some questions on “negative rates” and the impact they would have on financial institutions, and more specifically interest rate risk modeling. We’ve all heard about negative rates in Japan and parts of Europe, so it would seem reasonable to wonder about the impact that negative rates could have here in the U.S.
Do you have appropriate policy limits for all key interest rate risk measurements? How did you set your set them, and do they really still make sense for your institution?
When market rates weren’t changing, most institutions were in general compliance with policy limits. However, with the steady ramp up of rates through mid-2019, and then the massive drop in March of 2020, we’ve seen numerous financial institutions fall out of policy compliance. We’ve also heard from many of our clients that just aren’t sure what they should use for limits for the various non-parallel rate shock scenarios and now emphasized net income shock measurements. The old industry standard limits that so many institutions are still using just don’t seem to be working anymore.
Given the historic low U.S Treasury rate environment and the recent 150 basis point near-immediate drop in rates, we’re expecting an increased regulatory focus on interest rate risk (IRR) and liquidity management.
It’s no doubt that financial institutions will see pressure to not only reforecast their 2020 budgets, but also to run future IRR shocks and more custom “what-if” scenarios as part of their regular IRR modeling program. Liquidity management and stressed-scenario cash flow modeling are also more important now than ever.
For the past ten years or so, surge deposits have been a material issue in asset/liability management. At the time of, and following the 2007-2009 Great Recession, the banking industry saw a substantial influx of deposits as real estate and equity investors liquidated positions and sought safe places to store their money and ride out the storm. The impact of this flight to safety was compounded by Government sponsored initiatives such as the Transaction Account Guarantee (TAG) Program and increases in Federal deposit insurance levels.
As a result, banks experienced significant deposit growth, and while these surge deposits would have normally been seen as a good thing, the near evaporation of loan demand left many banks with far more deposit dollars than they could effectively put to use. In turn, market liquidity levels skyrocketed, but margins were compressed. For the purpose of this article, we’ll refer to these funds moving from real estate, equities, or any other investments into the banking system as Type I Surge Deposits.